Introduction
Transnationalism is an important perspective because immigrants' cross-border activities are intertwined with the way they live in receiving societies (Portes et al. 1999: 228) .
Although it has become widely recognized that a transnational perspective is significant for studies of immigration, such a perspective has not yet gained a strong foothold in the field of irregular immigration.
1 Studies on irregular migrants not only devote little attention to the transnational activities their research subjects engage in, but, when they do, the main focus is mostly on remittances instead of other cross-border activities.
Moreover, scholars who have studied this economic transnational activity have commonly focused on irregular migrants' transnational economic obligations and how these pose limitations for their incorporation in the receiving society and their chances of achieving upward social mobility there (see e.g. Burgers and Engbersen 1999; Mahler 1995; Morawska 2003; Roer-Strier and Olshtain-Mann 1999) .
While these research efforts have provided a preliminary understanding of the economic transnational activities of irregular migrants, most scholars in the field of irregular migration have not yet widened their view to include social and political transnational activities as well, whereas this is a common practice in the broader field of transnational studies (e.g. Bloch 2008; Levitt 2001; Østergaard-Nielsen 2001; Portes et al. 1999; Snel et al. 2006; Vertovec 2003) . This article attempts to contribute to the literature on irregular immigration by studying the economic, social and political transnational activities of irregular migrants. More specifically, by focusing on the relation between irregular migrants' aspirations and their transnational practices, it seeks to understand why certain irregular migrants do or do not engage in specific transnational activities. My research findings thereby provide insights from which the scholarly debate on immigrant incorporation and transnationalism in general could gain as well. In the next section, I discuss how a focus on aspirations might add to the current literature.
Transnationalism and irregular migrants
What exactly is meant by transnationalism is not always clear (Levitt et al. 2003 ), yet there is plenty of empirical research that calls itself transnational (Smith 2006) .
2
Transnationalism has originally been defined by Basch et al. (1994: 6) as 'the process by which transmigrants, through their daily activities, forge and sustain multi-stranded social, economic, and political relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement, and through which they create transnational social fields that cross national borders.' At first, studies on transnationalism tended to include all kinds of cross-border activities, thereby exaggerating its scope. Researchers also purposefully looked for transnational phenomena by selecting case studies in which transnational activities were abundant. In other words, many studies sampled on the dependent variable, for example by conducting qualitative studies of organizations active in the transnational field (Portes 2001 ).
In order to avoid sampling on the dependent variable, researchers have started to focus on the individual level instead of the level of the community (Portes et al. 1999 ). In addition, the exaggeration of the significance of transnationalism has made some scholars attempt to delimit its scope (see Portes et al. 1999) . These attempts have resulted in conceptualizations in terms of 'regular and sustained cross-border activities of individuals', making 'freedom of movement the point of departure', thereby implicitly excluding irregular migrants (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004: 1178) . Furthermore, in the literature on transnational social fields (see e.g. Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; Smith 2006) , irregular migrants are recognized as participants, but their experiences are not systematically compared to those of regular migrants because the emphasis in such studies is on the level of the community as a whole. Consequently, the question if and how irregular migrants specifically experience and engage in transnationalism is usually not asked.
In spite of the lack of specific attention for irregular migrants in the literature on immigrant transnationalism, a specific view on irregular migrants' transnational activities can be discerned in the limited number of empirical studies that deal with the effect of legal status on transnational activities. The common view is that irregular migrants are transnationally inactive because of the obstacles they face. Waldinger (2008: 18) , for example, found that irregular migrants visit their home country less frequently than regular migrants do and emphasizes that this is because of the barriers to cross-border mobility that irregular migrants experience. Furthermore, Mazzucato (2008: 213) claims 3 that the difficulties faced by irregular migrants in the receiving society 'hamper migrants' possibilities to invest in their home country.' Hence, because irregular migrants are less able to create a stable position for themselves in the receiving society, they are considered less equipped to engage in transnational activities. In addition, Bloch (2008: 298) found that migrants who had legal access to the labour market were 'more than six times' as likely to send economic remittances as other migrants. According to the author, this means that 'structural exclusions based on immigration status' adversely affect transnational capabilities (Bloch 2008: 302) . Likewise, Portes (2001: 189) found that 'immigrants' transnationalism is associated with a more secure economic and legal status in the host country.' According to this set of authors, transnational activities are consistently associated with legal status, apart from other higher human capital resources, such as education, immigration experience, occupational status (Bloch 2008; Mazzucato 2008; Portes 2003: 886; Waldinger 2008) . Following this line of reasoning, it is likely that irregular migrants' engagement in transnational activities is negligible.
A similar expectation can be derived from the literature on irregular immigration.
Researchers implicitly assume that irregular migrants do not have the possibility to engage in transnational activities because they have to struggle to survive. Scholars have extensively shown how irregular migrants' pre-migratory expectations are often unrealistically high (Adam et al. 2002; Mahler 1995; Staring 1999) . Stories of migrants who thought that the streets in the destination country are paved with gold are quoted frequently (see, for example , Staring 1999: 64) . Consequently, when migrants find out that the society they encounter does not offer the unlimited opportunities they envisioned, their adaptation processes are automatically oriented downwardly. Many studies describe how dreams are broken and how irregular migrants have to deal with the difficult conditions they face (Adam et al. 2002; Burgers and Engbersen 1999; Mahler 1995; Staring 1999; Van Nieuwenhuyze 2009) . In doing so, scholars equate the adaptation process that irregular migrants go through with a process of learning 'how to survive' in these societies.
Many scholars therefore explicitly use the term 'survival' to denote the lives irregular migrants lead (see e.g. Adam et al. 2002; Chavez [1992 Chavez [ ]1998 Datta et al. 2007; Düvell 2004; Düvell and Jordan 2006; Engbersen 1996; Jordan 2006 Aspirations form a conceptual bridge between structure and agency as they are rooted in both: they are constructed in the habitus of the individual where they are informed through socialization into larger cultural contexts and by the opportunity structure (MacLeod 2009: 15) . Distinguishing between different types of aspirations has proved to be helpful in studying other aspects of the lives of irregular migrants as well (Van Meeteren 2010; Van Meeteren et al. 2009 ). The analysis presented below demonstrates that distinguishing between different types of aspirations helps to understand the divergent transnational activities irregular migrants do and do not engage in: specific aspirations entail specific transnational orientations, and these prove to go 5 hand in hand with specific transnational activities -even among a structurally curtailed category as irregular migrants.
Before turning to the empirical analysis, the data and methods used in this study are discussed, followed by a concise overview of immigration policies in the Belgium and the Netherlands that provides background information.
Data and methods
Although no international comparison is intended, this research has been carried out in 
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Immigration policies play a decisive role in the allocation of life chances to irregular migrants (Burgers 1998; Engbersen et al. 2007; Menjivar 2006b ). As governments create opportunities and impose barriers to irregular migrants, state policies shape their window of opportunity and their room for maneuver. In addition, policies may also affect the choices that irregular migrants make within this window of opportunity (Cyrus and Vogel 2006; Holifield 2004) . Furthermore, the room for maneuver that policies create is not limited to the boundaries of the receiving nation-state: policies are considered to affect even irregular migrants' transnational interactions (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004) .
Being neighbouring countries with similar immigration histories, policies aimed at irregular migration do not show major differences in the Belgium and the Netherlands 
Three types of aspirations
Three types of aspirations of irregular migrants have arisen from my analysis. Irregular migrants with investment aspirations aim to work and make money in the country of destination, and to return to their country of origin once they have acquired enough savings. These respondents strive for future upward mobility in their country of origin.
They are usually 'target earners' (Massey et al. 1987 Like migrants with settlement aspirations, migrants with legalization aspirations often escape poor and corrupt countries. The category of legalization aspirations can be divided into two subcategories according to the strategies pursued to realize legalization.
The first type largely consists of former asylum seekers who try to become legalized by applying for regularization or by filing appeals in their asylum application. The reader should note that hereafter I use the terms investment migrants, settlement migrants and legalization migrants instead of the longer terms 'migrants with investment aspirations', 'migrants with settlement aspirations' and 'migrants with legalization aspirations' that I have used thus far, for reasons of readability.
Economic transnational activities
As investment migrants have come to the destination country to earn money that they want to invest in their home country, they usually remit large shares of their incomes. My respondents report that in practice, the sums of money they send home average between 2,000 and 5,000 euro per year. Investment migrants differ in the frequency in which they send their remittances: whereas some send small sums of money each month, others save larger amounts that they send every few months. Mehmet makes sure he sends money However, some investment migrants do not remit at all. Although these save large shares of their income, they choose to bring the money back themselves instead of sending it to their home country. Whether investment migrants send money to the country of origin or save it, in the end all this money is invested there. This means that either way, investment migrants are very much engaged in economic transnational activities.
Settlement migrants normally prioritize their own financial situation and remit much smaller shares of their incomes than investment migrants do. The amounts they send normally remain under 1000 euro per year. As they want to build their lives in the destination country they need money to do so. This does not mean that they do not remit at all, but settlement migrants typically remit a much smaller share of their incomes than investment migrants do. When I asked Isidora (Ecuador) if she sends money home, she responded:
A little. They [my parents] are old so I send a little bit of money. And my father is ill so I send a little money for that. (…) It is impossible to send more money because I have four children who make expenses. And we have to pay the rent and now that the children are studying they need internet so I have to pay the rent and the internet, the electricity, so the costs are high.
It is clear that Isidora does not work to support family in Ecuador but to support her family life in Belgium. Because settlement migrants aspire to a future in the destination country, they have often brought their closest relatives over. This stands in stark contrast to investment migrants, who have usually left their partner and children behind in the country of origin because they want to keep their costs down while working as much as possible in order to be able to make the desired investments in their home country. As settlement migrants are usually not financially responsible for family members back home, they only send small sums of money to their parents or extended family on an irregular basis, usually in case of special needs that come up in the country of origin.
In contrast, most legalization migrants do not send any money to their countries of origin. Legalization migrants often do not have any financial responsibility towards people in the home country because they usually have not migrated for economic reasons.
Moreover, they usually do not work or do not work that much because getting caught doing informal labour severely decreases the chances of legalization (cf. Van Meeteren 2010; Van Meeteren et al. 2009 ). This does not mean that they do not work because they are unable to or because they do not manage to find a job, but because they choose not to. one of these days God will see me through.' Instead of providing emotional support, the telephone calls to their relatives lead to increased stress which makes them call less often than they would like to. In some cases, legalization migrants even cut off all contact after a while.
In short, social transnational activities are not absent among irregular migrants in spite of the costs involved. 5 Not all irregular migrants engage in these activities to the same extent, though, which can largely be understood from their aspirations.
Political transnational activities
None often completely closed the door on ever returning to their country of origin or the problems in their origin countries are not considered that urgent (anymore). They find their own day-to-day problems already too big of a worry to exert themselves for yet another cause. As Tarek (Algeria) says: 'I like politics but (…) you know, you can't be a member of an organization if you have a problem that is more important than that.'
Likewise, legalization migrants who aim to get married are not involved in political transnational activities. They are occupied with meeting a potential partner for marriage and find this most important for the moment.
Although one would expect political transnational activities to be rare among irregular migrants, I found that they were rather common among a specific group: legalization migrants involved in procedures. This can partly be understood from the political situation in their countries of origin, and partly because it fits with their aspirations, in contrast to migrants with investment or settlement aspirations for whom this is not the case.
Conclusion and discussion
Above I have argued that a focus on aspirations helps to understand the transnational activities irregular migrants engage in. The results of my analysis are summarized in In the literature on immigrant transnationalism it is suggested that transnational activities are exceptional. Portes (2003: 877) , for example, notes that 'research has indicated that regular involvement in transnational activities characterizes only a minority of immigrants and that even occasional involvement is not a universal practice.'
Likewise, Waldinger (2008: 24) finds that 'transnationalism is a rare condition of being and transmigrants are an uncommon class of persons.' Furthermore, irregular migrants are expected to engage in transnational activities least of all because of the obstacles they face (cf. Portes et al. 2007 ). Portes (2001: 189) found that 'immigrant transnationalism is associated with a more secure economic and legal status in the host country.' Likewise, Bloch (2008: 302) claims that 'structural exclusions based on immigration status' adversely affect transnational capabilities.
From my research on a diverse population of irregular migrants, a different picture emerges. I have found that many of my respondents quite frequently engage in transnational activities, and that these are not limited to economic activities but include social and political activities as well. Thus, even irregular migrants -a category facing important structural barriers -prove to be engaged in specific transnational activities.
Moreover, it has proven fruitful to address aspirations to shed light on the question how to understand variety in the activities migrants do or do not undertake. Irregular migrants manage to find ways to engage in those types of activities that are important to them, in spite of the limitations they face. In fact, investment migrants prioritize their economic transnational engagements over their own well-being in the receiving society. This means that even though irregular migrants face barriers, these do not necessarily stop them from engaging in transnational activities.
Furthermore, I found that in those cases in which my respondents were not transnationally active, this is not necessarily because of the limitations they experience but that in specific cases this can be understood from their aspirations. This flies in the face of the implicit assumption that underlies much research which holds that as migrants 20 earn more, they engage more in economic transnational activities (see, for example, Bloch 2008) . When settlement migrants earn more, they do not necessarily remit more.
Instead, they mostly choose to spend their extra earnings on their own family in the receiving society. In addition, increasing income will most likely not make legalization migrants remit more but actually work less as they feel illegal work jeopardizes the realization of their aspirations. Only investment migrants increase their economic transnational activities if they earn more.
Moreover, whereas there may seem to be a logical relation between migrants' economic positions and their propensity to engage in economic transnational activities, this is less obvious for social and political transnationalism. An investment migrant from Turkey calls home more often than an investment migrant from Chile -because of the lower costs involved -but the latter makes calls more frequently than his co-nationals with settlement aspirations. Although it does cost money to make telephone calls and to participate in political activities, my respondents hardly mentioned these as reasons for lacking or infrequent activities. Whereas factors such as cost or income may have a limited affect on the frequency of specific activities, it is important not to ignore irregular migrants' aspirations. A huge step forward has been made by recognizing that in order to make statements about this relation, a differentiation needs to be made between economic, social and political activities, since the relation works differently for distinct types of activities (Snel et al. 2006 ). In addition, my findings suggest that future research should scrutinize 2 The findings reported in this article stem from a larger research project, for which some initial data on irregular migrants living in both countries were already available.
3 If a denied asylum seeker files an appeal in the asylum procedure in Belgium and the Netherlands, s/he resides there illegally. The appeal provides no rights to (temporary) legal stay.
4 Legalization migrants sometimes do not have transnational social contacts from the outset of their stay because they often come from countries with political issues which can make it downright impossible to contact family and friends. In that case an absence of social transnational activities cannot be understood from their current aspirationsinstead it is connected to a specific migration motive that is common among legalization migrants.
5 According to Vertovec (2004) , the advent of prepaid telephone cards has severely reduced the costs of international telephone calls. This adds to the argument that many settlement and legalization migrants do not make calls that often because of their aspirations and not because of barriers such as costs. 
